Contracting around Copyright: The Uneasy Case for
Unbundling of Rights in Creative Works
Guy A. Rubt
The Copyright Act grants authors and users a set of entitlements in copyrightable
works. It is questionable whether and to what extent authors and users can reallocate
these rights by entering into legally enforceable contracts. The Seventh Circuit's historic
decision in ProCD, Inc v Zeidenberg which held that contracts are usually not
preempted by the Copyright Act, produced an extensive debate in the copyright literature regardingthe enforceability and desirabilityof such contracts. Many participantsin
this debate, both supporters and critics of the court's holding, assume that the ProCD
rule enhances economic efficiency by allowing authors to unbundle the set of rights
prescribedby the CopyrightAct.
In this Article, I claim that,from an economic efficiency perspective, it is difficult
to defend the ProCD rule. I argue that the prevailing belief that this rule reduces the
wasteful deadweight loss associated with copyright is oversimplified and inaccurate.A
more persuasive argument is that the ProCD rule increases the incentive to create in the
long run. Such an efficient outcome, however, is desirableonly when it allows society to
mitigate the harm caused by other damaging components of the copyright system, and
this was not achieved by the ProCDdecision.
INTRODUCTION

Copyright law provides authors' and users of information goods
with a bundle of entitlements. When Anna sells a book she wrote to
Ben, copyright law divides the entitlements and possible usages of the
book between the two.2 Ben can keep the book, read it aloud to his
children, sell the book, destroy it, cite a short passage in a written review, photocopy a page to help him in teaching a class, and more. At
the same time, without Anna's authorization, Ben cannot copy the
t Associate, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP; SJD Candidate 2011, University of Michigan
Law School.
For helpful comments, I thank Omri Ben-Shahar, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Margaret J. Radin,
and the participants in the Law and Economics workshop at the University of Michigan Law
School and the Licensing of Intellectual Property Symposium at The University of Chicago Law
School. The views expressed in this work, as well as all remaining errors, are, of course, my own.
1 I loosely use the terms "author," "publisher," and "producer" to refer to the single
entity that created the work, had full possession of it before publication, published it, and holds
the copyright (if such exists) to it. Needless to say, sometimes one entity creates the work, another publishes it, and a third holds the copyright to it, and each of these entities might have
different interests and incentives. The conflicts that arise between the interests of these entities
are beyond the scope of this Article.
2
See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 Chi Kent L Rev
1203, 1204-06 (1998).
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entire book and sell it, read it aloud in public, translate it for commercial purposes, and more.' This initial division of entitlements is the
starting point determined by the Copyright Act, but the question is
whether it should also be the ending point. In other words, to what
extent should the parties be permitted to use legally enforceable contracts to trade these entitlements that were initially assigned to them?
Can Ben, for example, trade his right to cite parts of the book for permission to read it aloud in public? Can he trade it for a discount on
the book's price? Put differently, should copyright's initial allocation
of entitlements be treated as a default rule that the parties can contract around, or as a mandatory and inalienable allocation?
In ProCD, Inc v Zeidenberg,4 the Seventh Circuit implicitly held
that parties are allowed to trade their initially allocated rights.' The
decision used both doctrinal and economic reasoning and held that a
contractual cause of action is substantially different from a copyright
infringement cause of action and, therefore, is not preempted by the
Copyright Act.' A few years later, a split panel of the Federal Circuit
adopted this reasoning and explicitly ruled that an author can force a
licensee to waive the right of fair use, even in a standard form contract.' While most courts that have dealt with this issue since the
ProCD decision adopted a similar rule,' the ProCD decision came
under harsh criticism in the copyright literature.' Most of the debate
See 17 USC §§ 106-07, 109(a), 110(4).
86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
5 See id at 1449.
6 See id at 1454-55.
7
Bowers v Baystate Technologies, Inc, 320 F3d 1317, 1326 (Fed Cir 2003) (holding that
shrinkwrap terms prohibiting reverse engineering of software are enforceable even though reverse
engineering is considered fair use and therefore does not constitute copyright infringement).
8 See, for example, Davidson & Associates v Jung, 422 F3d 630, 639 (8th Cir 2005); Altera

3
4

Corp v Clear Logic, Inc, 424 F3d 1079, 1089-90 (9th Cir 2005); Lipscher v LRP Publications,Inc,

266 F3d 1305, 1318 (11th Cir 2001). But see Ritchie v Williams, 395 F3d 283, 287-88 (6th Cir
2005) (holding that a state court action, arising from a contract, is preempted by the Copyright
Act under the doctrine of "complete preemption"); Kabehie v Zoland, 125 Cal Rptr 2d 721, 731-34
(Cal App 2002) (stating that "[t]he majority of courts that have considered the breach of contract/federal copyright preemption issue have used a fact-specific analysis" and that therefore
acceptance of contract terms does not, in itself, preclude a finding of preemption pursuant to the
Copyright Act).
9

See, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:Im-

plicationsfor Contract, 73 Chi Kent L Rev 1367, 1378-86 (1998) (criticizing ProCD for, among
other things, comparing price discrimination to monopoly power rather than to a regime that
permits free copying); David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, and Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis
of Contract into Expand, 87 Cal L Rev 17, 42-63 (1999) (criticizing ProCD for, among other
things, extending quasi-copyright protection to works that are not copyrightable and for the
court's alleged failure to consider broader constitutional issues); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal L Rev 111, 147-51

(1999) (arguing that ProCD wrongly focused on preemption under 17 USC § 301 and did not
consider other relevant preemption doctrines, and that the type of contracts that are enforceable
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surrounding this ruling focuses on doctrinal issues, including the
proper way to interpret the preemption provision of the Copyright
Act and the applicability of other constitutional preemption doctrines.
This Article does not try to add to this doctrinal debate but instead
examines the ProCD rule from an economic efficiency perspective.
The analysis explores the two possible economic justifications for the
ProCD decision and suggests that the efficiency of the ProCD rule
might be questionable.
The ProCD decision allows parties to trade rights that are part of
the partial-bundling regime created by the Copyright Act. Therefore,
in this Article, this unbundling regime is compared with the forced
bundling regime that some commentators favor. Part I of this Article
explores the features of the unbundling regime as an imperfect, nonexclusive, second-degree price discrimination scheme.
Because unbundling of rights allows publishers to price discriminate among their consumers, Judge Frank Easterbrook, who wrote
the ProCD decision, and numerous commentators concluded that it is
an efficient regime that will reduce the deadweight loss caused by the
copyright system. Professor Randal Picker, for example, argued that
the type of regime that the ProCD decision fosters allows an author to
"march down the demand curve for a particular work,"" which means
that it allows authors to serve consumers who cannot afford the uniform monopoly price that is charged under a forced bundling regime.
Part II of this Article closely examines this justification for unbundling and concludes that while these arguments might be intuitively
appealing, they are inaccurate. Indeed, while the producer surplus
increases under an unbundling regime, it has an ambiguous effect on
the deadweight loss created by the copyright system and, therefore,
questionable efficiency.
In Part III, the long-term economic justification for the unbundling regime, which focuses on incentives for creation, is analyzed. I
argue that, in comparison to other rules that are current cornerstones
of our copyright regime, unbundling might be a more efficient way to
under ProCD can create "rights against the world" that might be contrary to public policy);
Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of

the Public Domain, 74 NYU L Rev 354, 429-35 (1999) ("The practical effect of the decision to
enforce mass market information licenses is that more uses of information will be prohibited to
more people."); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand L Rev 1799, 1812
(2000) (criticizing contractual price discrimination because it raises the price of inputs for new
inventions, thus skewing incentives for creation in favor of works that produce large private
gains at the expense of works intended primarily to benefit the public). See also Randal C. Picker, Easterbrookon Copyright,77 U Chi L Rev 1165,1178 (2010) ("ProCD is the opinion that the
copyright casebooks love to hate.").
10 Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertizationof Copyright,70 U Chi L Rev 281, 295 (2003).
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incentivize creation ex ante. Thus, for example, a legal system that offers authors a short protection period in which unbundling is permitted
is likely superior to a system that prescribes a long protection period
during which unbundling is not allowed. However, because this type of
balancing cannot be achieved by a court decision, the ProCD decision
might disturb the delicate balance between conflicting interests that is
reflected in the Copyright Act in a way that is not necessarily efficient.
I. UNBUNDLING AS A SOLUTION TO THE DIVERSITY IN THE
DEMAND FOR LICENSING AGREEMENTS

A. The Diversity in the Demand for Information Goods
The group of those who are willing to pay for rights in a specific
copyrightable work is typically heterogeneous. The members of this
group have different preferences, needs, wealth, and constraints, and
therefore they differ in their willingness to pay for various rights.
To illustrate this diversity in demand, let us look at a few typical
potential buyers of a copyright treatise. The autodidact is a layperson
who wants to learn about copyright doctrines. She is willing to pay for
the right to read specific chapters once but has no need to use the
treatise in any other way and is unwilling to pay for additional and
unnecessary rights. The law student is taking a copyright course and is
willing to pay for the right to access various chapters of the treatise
during the semester. The law professor has a higher willingness to pay,
but only if she can access and keep the treatise in perpetuity, quote
and possibly criticize it in her work, and make copies of small segments of the treatise to use in class. Like the law professor,the lawyer,
who has a higher willingness to pay, would like to access and keep the
work in perpetuity, quote it, copy a few pages, and possibly criticize it
in her briefs. The library has low elasticity of demand and a high willingness to pay, as long as it is given all of the rights that its patrons
need in addition to the right to lend the book and assign these rights
to its patrons.
Copyright law may not be sensitive to the differences in the customers' willingness to pay for various entitlements in a work. The
buyer of a book, for example, receives a preset bundle of rights in it.
This bundle includes the right to read the book, keep it in perpetuity,
resell and lend it, create a parody of it, and more. At the same time,
this bundle does not include the right to translate the book, read it
aloud in public, or receive a newer version of that book once it is published. If the author is not allowed to unbundle-that is, offer licenses
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that include sets of rights that are different from the one provided for
by the Copyright Act"-then her only remaining decision is to set a
monopoly price. The author will take into account the demands of the
various users and will try to set a price in a way that will maximize her
revenues. Thus, in the above example, the autodidactwill need to buy
the bundled product, which includes rights for which she has no need.
Moreover, because libraries and lawyers have a high willingness to
pay, their participation in this market can cause the uniform price to
soar, which will price out of the market many other users. On the other hand, if the author is allowed to unbundle the rights, she can use
the differences in preferences to segment the market, offer different
potential consumers licenses with different sets of rights, and thus
achieve price discrimination.
B.

First-, Second-, and Third-Degree Price Discrimination

Defining the term "price discrimination" is not a trivial task. As a
leading economic treatise puts it, "It is hard to come up with a satisfactory definition of price discrimination. Roughly, it can be said that the
producer price-discriminates when two units of the same [ ] good are
sold at different prices .... This definition is unsatisfactory."1 The
problem is not just one of definitions. "Price discrimination" is a term
that is used to describe various pricing strategies, and confusion about
them is prevalent in the literature. In this section, I clarify some of these
strategies and their application to an unbundling-of-rights regime.
When price discrimination is not used, a producer facing a downward-sloping demand curve (that is, a producer who has at least partial
monopoly power) must choose a uniform monopoly price that will
maximize her total revenues. The consequences of setting this monopoly price, which is typically higher than the marginal cost of production,
are an increase in producer surplus, a decrease in consumer surplus,
and, most importantly, the creation of a deadweight loss. Consumers
who are willing to pay more than the marginal costs of production but
less than the monopoly price will be priced out of the market, and the
potential surplus that could have been extracted by dealing with them
will be wasted.
2

11 It is beyond doubt that the Copyright Act, 17 USC § 101 et seq, allows unbundling with
respect to rights that are not included in the bundle it prescribes. For example, a seller can sell a
book with or without the right to make additional copies. The bundling regime discussed in this
Article is therefore actually a partial bundling regime, which prohibits only the unbundling of
those rights that the Copyright Act gives to buyers. See Gordon, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 1370-75
(cited in note 9).
12 Jean Tirole, The Theory of IndustrialOrganization133 (MIT 1988).
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Under a first-degree price discrimination scheme, also known as
perfect price discrimination, the producer sells the product to each consumer at a price equal to that consumer's reservation price." Under this
scheme, the entire consumer surplus and, more importantly, all of the
deadweight loss, is transformed into producer surplus. In other words,
every customer who is willing to pay at least the marginal costs of production will be able to buy the product, and society will not experience
the reduction in quantity that is the hallmark of monopoly pricing.
While first-degree price discrimination is commonly referred to
in the literature, including in the literature on transactions in information goods, it can rarely be achieved because producers cannot
know their customers' willingness to pay. Therefore, producers have
developed pricing schemes that allow them to indirectly assess those
reservation prices. In both second- and third-degree price discrimination schemes, the producer uses an approximation method to sort the
consumers into subgroups and match a different price to each subgroup. Second- and third-degree price discrimination schemes differ
in the ways in which this sorting and estimation is done.
Simply put, a second-degree price discrimination scheme, also
called versioning,1 means that the producer offers slightly different
versions of its product for different prices to all consumers." The small
variations between the versions are evaluated differently by different
consumers and constitute a tool of self-selection to help the producer
identify those with higher willingness to pay and lower elasticity of
demand.
Airline companies, for example, extensively use second-degree
price discrimination. While all travelers fly in the same airplane, on the
same route, and at the same time, they differ substantially in their reservation prices and elasticity of demand. Airlines therefore use a variety
of self-selection tools to help them identify consumers with lower elasticity (and offer them more expensive tickets). For example, buyers
who purchase tickets at the last minute or those who choose not to stay
at their destination for a weekend indicate that they are probably business travelers and will be charged more. Here, as is typical of seconddegree price discrimination schemes, the differences in the prices of the
tickets sold to those travelers are attributed primarily to the differences
in their willingness to pay and not to the costs to the airline.

See id at 135-37.
See Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 39, 53-82 (Harvard Business 1999).
15 See Tirole, Industrial Organizationat 135, 142-43 (cited in note 12); Michael E. Wetzstein, Microeconomic Theory 419 (Oxford 2005).
13

14
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When using a third-degree price discrimination scheme, the producer offers the same product to different subgroups of consumers for
different prices." The producer uses some exogenous, known information about its consumers (for example, age, occupation, location,
and so on) to estimate their reservation prices. For example, because
students and senior citizens have, on average, a lower willingness to
pay and higher elasticity of demand, movie theaters sometimes offer
them cheaper tickets."
C.

Unbundling of Rights as Second-Degree Price Discrimination

It seems that when some commentators use the term "price discrimination" to refer to unbundling of rights in information goods,
they might be envisioning a perfect price discrimination scheme.'" Unbundling of rights, however, is typically just one way" in which the
producer tries to achieve second-degree price discrimination.' The
product being sold is the copyrighted work together with a license,
and price discrimination is achieved by the different terms in each
license offered. The differences in the prices of the licenses cannot be
attributed primarily to differences in costs, but rather to the differences in consumers' preferences and to the producer's attempt to create a self-selection mechanism.
There are numerous examples of this practice. ProCD, for example, offered its clients two licenses: a limited cheap one for private
users and a broader and more expensive one for commercial users.
16 See Tirole, IndustrialOrganizationat 135, 137 (cited in note 12); Wetzstein, Microeconomic Theory at 423 (cited in note 15).
1
In many cases, producers use a variety of second- and third-degree price discrimination
tools at the same time. For example, some airlines use third-degree price discrimination by
offering cheaper student fares, while some movie theaters use second-degree price discrimination by offering cheaper tickets for Tuesday morning screenings.
18 See notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
19 There are many ways to segment the market and create a second-degree price discrimination scheme without unbundling rights. For example, the publisher can offer versions that
differ in the accessibility of updates, prestige (hardcover versus paperback versions), comprehensiveness, and so on. See Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules at 55-61 (cited in note 14).
Moreover, the producer can also use third-degree price discrimination and, for example, offer a
special "law student version" of its product. While the possibilities are numerous, in some cases
the most efficient way, and maybe the only practical way, to segment the market is by unbundling rights.
20
This Article focuses on licenses that create second-degree price discrimination, like
the licenses created by ProCD. Other licenses, probably less common, can create third-degree
price discrimination. For example, LexisNexis allows law students to access its databases for
free but contractually binds them not to transfer this right, or the information extracted by
using it, to others. See LexisNexis, Terms & Conditions (Nov 11, 2009), online at
https://www.lexisnexis.com/terms/ (visited Oct 21, 2010).
21
In fact, ProCD offered a third license that included an online subscription through
AOL. ProCD,86 F3d at 1449.
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Similarly, iTunes used to offer some songs in two versions: a limitedlicense version for $0.99 and an unlimited personal-use license for
$1.29.' Movie studios offer "self-destructing" DVDs that the buyer
can use for a few days for $5 3 and "regular" DVDs that can be used

permanently for approximately $20.
LexisNexis, which uses third-degree price discrimination schemes
(for example, student licenses), also uses second-degree price discrimination schemes by offering cheaper licenses that limit the user's right
to print or download information from its database.' Several copyright treatises, such as Nimmer on Copyright, are offered by LexisNexis. Thus, the publisher of the treatise can first separate those who
prefer to buy an expensive hardcopy from those who prefer the online
version and then rely on LexisNexis's ability to create a fine-tuned
price discrimination scheme within the latter group.
D.

Enforcing the Licenses and the Costs of Separation

From the producer's perspective, unbundling of rights, like other
second- and third-degree price discrimination schemes, is far from
perfect. It has limited benefits, and it is costly. The producer uses unbundling to try to estimate her consumers' reservation prices based on
their usage, and such estimation can never be precise. Customers with
similar needs might have different reservation prices. Unbundling of
rights does not allow the producer to separate them.
Moreover, even if the consumers differ in their needs and separation is possible, unbundling might be too expensive to implement and
enforce. When the producer segments the market and creates licenses,
she must make many choices (for example, how many licenses to create, for which subgroups, and at what prices) that require collecting
information on potential consumers. The publisher must therefore
take into account the costs of collecting this information. Separation
costs also include the transaction costs associated with implementing
the corresponding licenses (for example, increases in the costs of

22

See Apple, Apple Unveils Higher Quality DRM-Free Music on the iTunes Store (Apr 2,

2007), online at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.htmi (visited Oct 21, 2010).
23 Those movies are protected by FlexPlay technology. See Flexplay, How It Works, online at
http://www.flexplay.com/how-it-works/ (visited Oct 21, 2010) (describing how Flexplay's patented
disc technology reacts once removed from its sealed packaging-the user can watch the DVD for a
limited time, but exposure to oxygen renders the disc unreadable after forty-eight hours).
24 For a listing of various LexisNexis pricing options for certain (governmental) customers,
see LexisNexis, Federal Supply Schedule Price List, online at http://www.lexisnexis.com/gsa/76/
GSASched76_PriceList.pdf (visited Oct 21, 2010).
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drafting, the consumers' search costs, and so on).' Finally, the publisher must keep in mind that licenses, like any other contract, are not
always performed, and the publisher must therefore implement costly
measures to discourage breaches. '
In some situations, license agreements are breached in public.
For example, reviewing a library's catalog might allow a publisher to
detect whether it lends DVDs in breach of a license. Similarly, most
transformative uses, whether considered fair use or not, are made in
public. Reducing the number of breaches in these situations requires a
monitoring system backed by a reliable threat of litigation.
Encryption is a self-enforcing tool that prevents consumers from
using a product in a way that is inconsistent with a license and can
reduce the likelihood of breaches, including nonpublic breaches." Encryption, however, is not always practical, and it is neither costless nor
immune to circumvention. When circumvention happens, it is typically difficult to detect and even more difficult to bring to an end. A
reliable threat of litigation is therefore typically required to reduce
such circumvention.
Finally, the publisher must deal with the problem of privity. ' As
contracts do not create rights in rem, the publisher must be able to
prove that the defendant consented to the license in order to establish
a contractual cause of action. The publisher cannot always condition
the transfer of the product on acceptance of the terms, especially
when it is being transferred from one consumer to another, which increases the risk of a break in the privity chain.
Producers of information goods try to solve this privity problem by
attaching the license to the goods in a way that prevents usage prior to
25 See Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules at 67-72 (cited in note 14) (discussing how
many versions of an information good the producer should offer); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright
Law and PriceDiscrimination,23 Cardozo L Rev 55, 76-77 (2001) (discussing sorting costs).
26 It should be noted that unbundling of rights does not create an arbitrage problem because
the licenses are offered at the same price to everyone and therefore no secondary market can exist.
27 Encryption became popular in the digital era and especially after Congress enacted the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998), which
prohibits circumventing certain technical protection measures and criminalizes the production
and dissemination of technology, devices, or services that are used for such circumvention. 17
USC §§ 1201,1204.
28

See Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?Property Rights and Contractin the "New-

tonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 Berkeley Tech L J 115, 119-21 (1997) (discussing the
problem of contractual privity in cyberspace and how it affects a publisher's ability to sue downstream infringers). For examples in which the lack of privity harmed the copyright owner's case,
see Vernor v Autodesk, Inc, 555 F Supp 2d 1164, 1176 (WD Wash 2008) (holding that a license
between the copyright holder and the first licensee does not bind subsequent purchasers); SoftMan Products Co v Adobe Systems, Inc, 171 F Supp 2d 1075, 1087 (CD Cal 2001) (holding that a

purchaser of software is not bound by an end user license agreement that it did not accept by
installing the software).
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acceptance of the terms. Clickwraps, which are widely used in the
software industry, are an example of such a technique. 29 Such a
scheme, however, is not only costly and legally questionable" but in
some cases (for example, books or music recordings) is also quite difficult and expensive to implement, if possible at all.
Therefore, while there are several tools that encourage customers to
abide by license terms, these tools are costly and cannot guarantee that
the license will always be accepted and never breached. Consequently,
even when two users have different needs and willingness to pay, the
producer might not be willing to offer them different licenses, as the private costs of segmentation might be higher than the private benefits.
II. UNBUNDLING AND COPYRIGHT'S DEADWEIGHT Loss

The previous Part shows how authors of information goods can
use contracts to unbundle the rights in their work and thus to price
discriminate among their customers. In the rest of this Article, I analyze the economic effects of such a pricing scheme. In this Part, I consider the effects of unbundling on total welfare, while in the next Part
I consider its effects in the long run.
Authors of information goods are better off under an unbundling
regime. In some (rare) cases in which unbundling does not increase producer surplus, it will not be used, and therefore producer surplus can
never decrease under unbundling -it will, in most cases, increase. While
this conclusion is somewhat obvious, in this Part I focus on the more
complex effects of unbundling and explore whether it enhances efficiency by reducing the deadweight loss created by the copyright regime.

29 ProCD's software, for example, required the user to click "I agree" to the terms of the
license every time the software was used. See ProCD, 86 F3d at 1450.
30
It is unclear whether the terms of a contract that the buyer cannot read prior to payment, as is typically the case, are binding. Compare Hill v Gateway 2000, Inc, 105 F3d 1147, 1149
(7th Cir 1997) (holding that the terms of an agreement that was sent with a computer that was
purchased over the phone are binding), with Klocek v Gateway, Inc, 104 F Supp 2d 1332, 1340
(D Kan 2000) (holding that the terms of an agreement that was sent with a computer that was
purchased over the phone are not part of the contract between the parties and therefore not
binding). Furthermore, some have argued that when the producer attaches the license to a copy
of the work, the contract "runs with" the tangible property and is therefore a servitude. Such
classifying raises several legal issues that are beyond the scope of this Article. For example,
should this servitude comply with the touch and concern doctrine? If so, does it? More generally,
should private parties be allowed to create new enforceable property rights? See, for example,

Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons, 70 L
& Contemp Probs 23, 40 (2007); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of
Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 Fordham L Rev 375, 379-80 (2005);

Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U Chi L Rev 1449, 1478 (2004); Lemley, 87
Cal L Rev at 119-21 (cited in note 9).
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A. The Conflicting Effects of Unbundling on the Deadweight Loss
Most commentators on unbundling of rights in information goods
have suggested, or at least assumed, that this regime enhances efficiency, as it increases access to the work and reduces deadweight
loss." There is an appealing logic to this claim. Copyright law accords
authors a monopoly power that prevents free entry into the market.
This power allows the author to charge a price higher than the marginal costs of production, which makes recovering the fixed costs of
creation possible. A side effect of this monopoly pricing scheme is
deadweight loss-the pricing out of the market of consumers whose
reservation prices are higher than the marginal costs of production
but lower than the monopoly price. If, instead, authors were able to
price discriminate by continuing to charge the high monopoly price to
the high-paying consumers while offering a cheaper, limited license to
the low-paying users, everyone would be better off. Differently put,
the intuition is that unbundling of rights, like perfect price discrimination, allows the producer to sell the product to additional segments of
the market that would otherwise be priced out and thus reduces the
deadweight loss.
This conjecture is quite prevalent. In his ProCD decision, Judge
Easterbrook drew on this logic when he stated that "[i]f ProCD had to
recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single price ... it
would have to raise the price substantially . . . . The ensuing reduction

in sales would harm consumers."32 Other commentators agree. For example, Professor Picker argued that unbundling allows the producer to
"march down the demand curve for a particular work."" Professor
Picker referred to the producer's ability to serve consumers with low
reservation prices who are priced out of the market under uniform
monopoly pricing-in other words, to serve customers located on the
"lower" end of the demand curve. Even commentators who are critical of the ProCD decision, like Professor Wendy Gordon, concede
that "a monopolist charging a single price imposes a higher
deadweight loss on society than one who does not."'
In this Part, I argue that this supposition is incomplete and inaccurate, and that unbundling of rights has a more ambiguous effect on
See notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
86 F3d at 1449.
33 Picker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 295 (cited in note 10). This phrase was later cited by Judge Easterbrook. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright,42 Houston L Rev 953,967 (2005).
34 Gordon, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 1390 (cited in note 9). See also Fisher, 73 Chi Kent L Rev
at 1238-40 (cited in note 2) (arguing that the use of contracts and technological protections
increases access to information goods and decreases deadweight loss). But see Meurer, 23
Cardozo L Rev at 90-94 (cited in note 25).
31
32
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the deadweight loss. In fact, unbundling of rights creates two countereffects. I will call one the new markets effect and the other the pooramong-the-rich effect. The new markets effect, which reduces

deadweight loss and resembles the aforementioned argument made
by Judge Easterbrook and Professor Picker, occurs because unbundling allows the producer to offer a cheaper, limited version of its
product and make it accessible to some of the consumers who were
priced out of the market under a bundling regime.
When a publisher uses unbundling, she must sort potential consumers into subgroups and set a uniform price for each such subgroup. This price will typically price out of the market the members of
the group who have relatively low reservation prices. This is the pooramong-the-rich effect, and it causes an increase in deadweight loss.
For example, a public library might be able, under bundling, to buy
DVDs on the retail market and lend them to its patrons. Under an
unbundling regime, the publisher might create two licenses: one for
the general public that will prohibit lending and another, primarily for
libraries, that will allow it. Because the libraries subgroup includes
rich buyers with low elasticity, such as Redbox and Netflix, the price
of this "lending license" might be set too high for public libraries,
which will be priced out of this market completely. The poor-amongthe-rich effect does not exist under perfect price discrimination (those
poor customers are offered licenses for a price equal to their low reservation prices), which might explain why it is usually overlooked in
the literature on this issue.
Indeed, for some subgroups-typically those with higher elasticity
and lower reservation prices-the price under unbundling is lower, the
new markets effect dominates, and the deadweight loss is smaller. For
other subgroups, typically those with lower elasticity and higher reservation prices, the price under bundling is higher, the poor-among-the-rich
effect dominates, and the deadweight loss is larger. As demonstrated
below, the size of these subgroups and the difference in the price
charged to each, which are case dependent, will determine whether, in a
given case, the total deadweight loss will increase or decrease."

35 Unbundling probably also has a progressive distributional effect. Generally speaking,
under unbundling the price charged to low-paying subgroups typically decreases while the price
charged to high-paying subgroups increases. Usually, consumers with higher willingness to pay
are relatively richer and, therefore, in most cases, unbundling redistributes wealth from relatively richer consumers to poorer ones. This argument is of course simplified and incomplete.
For example, some of those who are priced out of the market under unbundling, such as public
libraries, serve a large group of poor customers. See Cohen, 53 Vand L Rev at 1806 (cited in
note 9). See also Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules at 47-49 (cited in note 14).
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Unbundling and Deadweight Loss in a Two-Subgroup Market

B.

By using unbundling, a producer divides the group of customers
into subgroups. In this section, I focus on a simplified example in
which the producer decides to separate the group of potential customers into just two subgroups.
Let us assume that the potential consumers of a certain work, like
the consumers of ProCD's product,' can be divided into two distinct
subgroups: one big subgroup with limited needs and lower willingness
to pay (which will be called private users) and another smaller subgroup with more extensive needs and higher willingness to pay (which
will be called commercial users).

Under bundling, the producer will need to choose one monopoly
price. She can choose a low price, serve both subgroups, and thus have
a high volume of sales. Alternatively, she can charge a high price,
serve only the commercial users and extract a larger surplus from
them while pricing out the private users, and experience a decrease in
her volume of sales. The producer will need to weigh the private users' numbers against the commercial users' higher reservation prices.
Figure 1 shows the producer's revenues as a function of the price
she charges.
FIGURE 1

Price
Private Users .*****---Commercial Users -

---

36

Price A

See ProCD, 86 F3d at 1449.

-

Price B

-----

Total Revenue
Price C

270

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:257

The dashed curve on the left represents the revenues the producer can gain from sales to private users. The dotted curve on the right
represents the revenues the producer can gain from sales to commercial users. The third curve is the accumulation of those two curves and
represents the total revenues from selling to all customers as a function of the price demanded under bundling.
The total revenue curve has two local maximum points, each representing one of the aforementioned prices that the producer can
choose. The producer can sell at a low price and serve both subgroups
(Price B) or sell at a high price and serve only the commercial subgroup (Price C). Even a small shift in any revenue curve can change
the choice that the producer will make. From the producer's perspective, the choice between B and C might be insignificant, but from a
social welfare perspective, this choice has a substantial effect on the
size of the deadweight loss under bundling and on the relative efficiency of an unbundling regime.
If under bundling the producer decides to serve just commercial users (Price C), then the deadweight loss will be substantial."
Therefore, under unbundling, the new markets effect will dominate,
as private users will be served (Price A). At the same time, the pooramong-the-rich effect will not exist, as commercial users with relatively low reservation prices-the poor among the rich-are not
served under either regime. In this case, unbundling does not harm
anyone, and it is, therefore, Pareto superior to bundling.
On the other hand, if the producer decides to serve both markets
under bundling (Price B), then unbundling might increase the deadweight loss. The new markets effect, which is the result of the small
price decrease-from B to A-for the private users subgroup, will be
insignificant. But the poor-among-the-rich effect, which is the result
of the large price increase-from B to C-for the commercial users
subgroup, will be significant, and many commercial users with relatively low reservation prices will be priced out of the market under
unbundling.
Actual situations in which producers of information goods must
decide whether to serve a large group of private users or a substantially
37 In making this argument, I ignore the effects of piracy. In fact, when the producer sets a
high price for a product that can be used, if offered cheaply, by many private users, some members of that subgroup will gain access to the work by using illegal pirated copies, and the
deadweight loss will be reduced. A full analysis of the effects of piracy on pricing decisions and
deadweight loss is beyond the scope of this Article. For an example of such an analysis, see Mark
A. Lemley and R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting
Innovation, 56 Stan L Rev 1345, 1374 n 110 (2004) ("Infringement can fill in for the deadweight
loss caused by copyright by, for example, allowing those who are not willing to pay the full retail
price for a CD to acquire it illegally for less.").
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smaller group of commercial users are quite common. For example,
most DVD producers choose a price that allows many private users to
buy DVDs, although, consequentially, commercial users, such as libraries, can purchase them at a price that is significantly lower than
their willingness to pay.' On the other hand, other information goods
are clearly targeted at small professional subgroups. For example,
Adobe sells its cheaper version of Photoshop for $699 and, until recently, stated openly that it is "ideal for professional photographers,
serious amateur photographers, graphic designers and web designers.""
Similarly, Nimmer on Copyright is sold for $2,138, which prices out
most private users.
It is therefore difficult to generalize about the efficiency of unbundling in decreasing the deadweight loss and increasing the total surplus.
In fact, it is difficult to identify even broad categories of cases or some
general rule of thumb for cases in which unbundling reduces
deadweight loss. The facts of ProCD,as described by the district court
and the Seventh Circuit, are no exception and do not allow us to decide
whether unbundling increased or decreased the deadweight loss.
C.

Limitations and Expansions

The model I used in this Part is simpler than many real-life situations. Future research can therefore explore how the relaxation of
some of my simplifying assumptions can influence the magnitude of
the aforementioned effects and whether some factual situations can
be identified in which one effect clearly dominates." In the next few
38
In practice, commercial, for-profit libraries typically enter into specific contractual
arrangements with Hollywood studios. See Eddins v Redstone, 35 Cal Rptr 3d 863, 871-72 (Cal
App 2005); Redbox Automated Retail LLC v Universal City Studios LLLP, 2009 WL 2588748, *2
(D Del 2009). See also, for example, G6rard P. Cachon and Martin A. Lariviere, Supply Chain
Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, 51 Mgmt Sci 30, 42
(2005) (demonstrating the advantages and disadvantages of a revenue-sharing model using the
video rental industry as an example). Public libraries, however, typically buy fewer copies and, in
some cases, purchase in the general retail market.
39 Adobe Systems, Photoshop CS5 Editions, online at http://www.adobe.com/products/
photoshop/compare/ (visited Oct 21, 2010). Adobe changed this description in its latest line of
products, although the price did not change materially.
40
See LexisNexis, The Store: Nimmer on Copyright, online at http:l/wwwlexisnexis.coml
store/catalog/booktemplate/productdetail.jsp?pageName=relatedProducts&prodd=10441
(visited Oct 22, 2010). Those are, of course, simplified examples. In practice, most producers use a
variety of second- and third-degree price discrimination schemes to exploit other segments of
the market too. DVDs, for example, are released to the public through various channels at different times, which allows the studios to charge more to some commercial users (such as theaters). On the other hand, Adobe offers a cheaper student version of Photoshop that allows it to
serve some private users.
41
In the economic literature, there is an attempt to identify assumptions under which an
increase or a decrease in deadweight loss can be expected. See, for example, Richard Schmalensee,
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paragraphs, I mention some of these assumptions and their significance and offer some initial thoughts on the effects of their relaxation.
This discussion is, by its nature, incomplete. The possibilities are numerous, and a full analysis of them is beyond the scope of this Article.
Some simplifying assumptions should not affect the core argument. For example, the implicit assumption that the cross-elasticity of
demand between the subgroups is zero,4 or that the demand of the
various subgroups is well defined and does not depend on the bundling
process itself," should not undermine the argument. Even under a more
complex model in which these assumptions are relaxed, the total effect
of unbundling is expected to remain ambiguous because it causes a
price increase for some subgroups and a price decrease for others.
The heterogeneity of demand in each subgroup might have a
more profound impact on the deadweight loss. The more homogeneous a subgroup, the bigger the share of the surplus that can be captured by the producer by setting a uniform price for that subgroup,
the smaller the poor-among-the-rich effect, and the smaller the
deadweight loss. Therefore, sorting the customers into more and more
subgroups should reduce the variance among their members' reservation prices and reduce the poor-among-the-rich effect and the
deadweight loss, although it will also increase separation costs.
Finally, future research might further explore the impact that
changes in separation cost might have on the two effects. For example, it is possible that the marginal costs of separating high-paying
consumers into additional subgroups is lower on average than the
marginal costs of further separating the low-paying consumers. The
reason is that the first subgroup is smaller in size and includes those
who are willing to pay more, and thus, for example, the transaction
costs in reaching tailored contracts with members of this subgroup
might be smaller than the surplus of such transactions. This means
that, in some situations, it will be possible to further separate the highpaying subgroups, which might reduce the magnitude of the pooramong-the-rich effect.
Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination, 71 Am
Econ Rev 242, 246 (1981); Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 Am Econ

Rev 870, 875 (1985); Jerry A. Hausman and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Price Discrimination and
Patent Policy, 19 RAND J Econ 253, 263 (1988).
42 In other words, the assumption is that the price charged to one subgroup does not affect
demand in another. In some situations, like ProCD, this assumption is reasonable. In other
situations, such as the DVD lending license mentioned in Part IIA, a change in the price
charged to one subgroup can affect demand in another.
43 There are situations in which this assumption will not hold. For example, regardless of
the extra legroom, the willingness of consumers to pay for a business-class ticket might be higher
than their willingness to pay for a "bundled" ticket with all other passengers. In this example,
unbundling itself increases the reservation prices of business travelers.

2011]

Contractingaround Copyright

273

Therefore, while the core argument presented in this Part makes
doubtful the efficiency of the ProCDrule as a deadweight-minimizing
rule, further research may shed more light on the pricing strategies
used under bundling and unbundling and their effects on the size of
the deadweight loss.
III. UNBUNDLING OF RIGHTS AS AN Ex ANTE
INCENTIVE TO CREATE

While it is unclear if an unbundling regime reduces the
deadweight loss associated with copyright monopoly, this Part explores whether it can be defended as a legal rule that incentivizes ex
ante the creation of information goods in a relatively efficient way. I
start by commenting on the criteria for efficient copyright rules and
then explore the relative efficiency of unbundling and compare it to
other legal rules. I argue that, under these criteria, unbundling is, subject to certain limitations, efficient.
A. The Long-Term Efficiency of Unbundling of Rights
In the long run, it is wrong to conclude that an intellectual property rule" is relatively efficient or inefficient by only considering its
effect on deadweight loss or total surplus.
Deadweight loss is an unavoidable side effect of the monopoly
power that allows authors to cover the fixed costs of creation. It is the
price that society pays to solve a public-good problem in the creation
of information goods. Intellectual property policy should, therefore,
aim to provide the optimal incentives for creation while decreasing
the harm of the monopoly power and especially the deadweight loss.
Suboptimal incentives can worsen the public-good problem and cause
suboptimal investment by authors, which will reduce the number and
quality of works created. On the other hand, overincentivizing can

4
One may question whether ProCD, which concerned a work that was not copyrightable,
is even relevant to a discussion about legal incentives to create. See Gordon, 73 Chi Kent L Rev
at 1385 (cited in note 9); Nimmer, Brown, and Frischling, 87 Cal L Rev at 42-63 (cited in note 9)
(criticizing ProCD because a publisher of a database was awarded some market power, which

allegedly is not allowed under Feist Publications, Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340

(1991)). See also ProCD, 86 F3d at 1449. It is wrong, however, to conclude from Feist that no
legal rule may incentivize the creation of databases. In fact, many legal doctrines allow some
publishers of databases to cover the fixed costs of creation. See Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook
on the Economic Dimension of the Database Protection Debate, 47 IDEA 93, 147-66 (2006)

(discussing how certain legal rules outside the realm of copyright law protect the creators of
databases against free riding and unlimited copying of their work). From a legal policy perspective, the same challenge exists in both situations: What set of legal rules can efficiently incentivize creation while causing minimal harm?
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lead to excessive investment in creation, which is a form of rent-seeking that creates economic waste.
The set of rules included in any copyright regime should promote
these goals and should constantly be modified to do so.' While rules
that increase the incentives to create also typically increase the
deadweight loss (and vice versa), they differ in the ratio between private benefit and social harm.' Therefore, a legal rule that insignificantly
reduces deadweight loss while substantially decreasing producer surplus might be undesirable, as it overdiscourages creation. Consequently, a crude criterion for comparing the efficiency of two possible
copyright rules is to look at the ratio of their effects on the producersurplus (the incentive to create) to their effects on the deadweight loss. A
rule that creates a higher ratio is typically more efficient in the long run.

An unbundling-of-rights regime seems superior to a bundling regime under this criterion, because unbundling typically causes only a
minor change in the deadweight loss but increases the producer surplus
substantially. As discussed in Part II, unbundling typically causes a
price increase for the high-paying subgroups that increases the producer surplus and the deadweight loss (the poor-among-the-rich effect)
and a price decrease for the low-elasticity subgroups that increases the
producer surplus and decreases the deadweight loss (the new markets
effect). The changes in deadweight loss therefore partially cancel each
other out, and the total effect of unbundling on deadweight loss is usually modest. On the other hand, the producer surplus increases in all
subgroups, which means that the total incentive to create will typically
increase significantly. Thus, the ratio between the producer surplus and
the deadweight loss is usually higher under unbundling than under

45 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law 16-18 (Chicago 2003) (discussing rent seeking); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright

and ProductDifferentiation,79 NYU L Rev 212, 260--64 (2004); Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial OrganizationApproach to Copyright Law, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 33, 71-77 (2004) (arguing

that, according to certain models of imperfect competition, overincentivizing can lead to excessive entry into a given market, which wastes resources).
46 The relative efficiency of copyright rules depends on extraneous factors, and in particular on the current technologies that allow the creation, copying, and distribution of information
goods as well as their costs. From time to time, Congress has to modify this set of rules and
tweak the legal protection of information goods in order to achieve this efficiency goal. See, for
example, Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 US 417, 430 (1984) ("From its

beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology."). See also, for example, Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, HR Rep No 105-551,
Part 2, 105th Cong, 2d Sess 21 (1998) (noting that the DMCA was enacted "as part of the effort
to begin updating national laws for the digital era").
47

See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Hary L Rev

1813, 1821 (1984) (noting in the context of patents that "[i]t is simply not true that all activities
generating equal profits impose equal damages upon society").
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bundling. Consequently, an unbundling-of-rights regime is relatively
harmless and thus a cheaper price to pay for incentivizing creation.
How to Incentivize Creation: Balancing Unbundling of Rights
and Copyright Protection Length

B.

There are many elements in our copyright system that can increase or decrease incentives to create and the harm caused by the
rightholder's monopoly.' In this section, as an example of the longterm efficiency of unbundling, I compare it to one of the building
blocks of any copyright regime-the length of protection."
It seems self-explanatory that the longer the protection period, the
larger the incentive to create, and that publishers should therefore prefer a longer protection period. Nevertheless, publishers should be indifferent between a legal regime that offers them long and relatively weak
protection (for example, by forcing bundling) and one that offers shorter
and stronger protection (by allowing unbundling). From a total welfare
perspective, however, the latter regime is preferable because allowing
publishers to unbundle the rights in their works is not expected, on average, to create significant harm (as unbundling causes only a modest
effect on the deadweight loss), while lengthening the protection period
creates more and more deadweight loss over the years.
There are additional reasons that render the short unbundling regime superior to the long bundling regime. The marginal increase in
the incentive to create decreases as the length of protection increases.
This is because the demand for a work typically diminishes over time'
48 See generally Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Reme-

dies, 97 Mich L Rev 985 (1999) (discussing the balance between uncertainty and delays in granting
remedies for patent infringement and the length of protection). While I chose to explore the
tradeoff between unbundling and the optimal length of protection, future research may explore
other possible tradeoffs between other elements in our copyright regime (for example, the scope
of the exclusive rights, the scope of the statutory defenses, or the remedies for infringement).
49 The length of protection is one of the most discussed aspects of the Copyright Act. In a
series of amendments, primarily in the last thirty-five years, Congress has extended the term of
protection from fourteen years, which could be renewed for another fourteen-year term, to the
current protection period, which is the life of the author plus seventy years. See Melville B. Nimmer
and David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 9.01 at 9-3-9-4 (Matthew Bender 2010); William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U Chi L Rev 471, 471-73
(2003); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright'sFirstAmendment, 48 UCLA L Rev 1057,1065 (2001).
50

See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,

Photocopies,and Computer Programs,84 Harv L Rev 281, 324-25 (1970) ("[O]nly one book in a
hundred is in print after fifty-six years.... [M]any of these sell only a few copies.... [Publishers]
base their publication decision upon an expectation that a book will earn a return within ... at
most ten or twenty years."); Landes and Posner, 70 U Chi L Rev at 473-74, 496-507 (cited in
note 49) (showing that "fewer than 11 percent of the copyrights registered between 1883 and
1964 were renewed at the end of their twenty-eight-year term, even though the cost of renewal
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and because authors invest the fixed costs of creation up front and
discount their future revenue streams to present value at the time of
creation." Consequently, by lengthening the protection period by a
certain percentage, the incentives to create are increased by a smaller
degree. Finally, transaction costs, and in particular tracing costs, also
increase with the length of copyright protection." Indeed, permitting
unbundling will allow society to significantly shorten the protection
period and thus substantially reduce economic waste.
C. Possible Limitations
While the analysis suggests that unbundling should typically be
included in the set of incentives offered to authors of information
goods, in the following paragraphs I mention a few possible factors for
which this simple model does not fully account.
1. The costs of separation.
As we have seen, unbundling involves separation costs. Those
costs reduce the producer surplus and therefore decrease the relative
attractiveness of the unbundling regime. In fact, it is not difficult to
envision situations in which unbundling increases the deadweight loss
but most of the increase in the producer surplus is wasted on separation costs. In such a case, the producer will still choose to unbundle,
but the ratio between the producer surplus and the deadweight loss
might be higher under bundling, and therefore unbundling might be
relatively inefficient in the long run.
Nevertheless, it seems that, on average, the ratio between producer surplus and deadweight loss will be higher under unbundling
even if the separation costs are not negligible. The reason has to do
with the average effects of unbundling on the relevant economic factors: an insignificant increase or decrease in deadweight loss, a substantial increase in producer surplus, and the existence of separation costs
that may be smaller than the producer surplus, comparable, or, in theory, larger. But, if the separation costs are higher than the producer
surplus, then they will not be borne because the producer will choose
was small," and that only 1.7 percent of the books published in the United States in 1930 were
still in print in 2001).
51 See Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 324 (cited in note 50); Ayres and Klemperer, 97 Mich L
Rev at 1005 (cited in note 48).
52 See Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 326 (cited in note 50) (observing that, with time, it becomes more difficult to find the copyright owner in order to secure permission). But see Landes
and Posner, Economic Structure at 213-17 (cited in note 45) (arguing that tracing costs would
not be substantial even if the length of protection is long if copyright holders had to register in a
searchable database).
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not to unbundle. Therefore, in the cases in which unbundling is used,
the change in the producer surplus will be larger than the separation
costs. Overall, the increase in the producer surplus, while mitigated by
the separation costs, will be, on average, more significant than the
change in the deadweight loss, and the ratio between the deadweight
loss and the producer surplus will be higher under unbundling. Thus,
even if the separation costs are significant, in the long run unbundling
is an efficient tool to incentivize creation.
2. The costs of creation.
The discussion so far has focused on buyers who consume but do
not create information goods. Information goods, however, are not
just the product of the creative process but also an input in it. The vast
majority of creative works are built upon other works previously published.' A rule that limits access to information goods can therefore
increase the costs of creation. As suggested above, we cannot know a
priori whether an unbundling regime will generally increase or decrease access to copyrighted works.
Nevertheless, certain rules in our copyright regime, in particular
fair use, bundle together the right to access a work and the right to create certain transformative works. Allowing the producer to unbundle
those rights may result in a price increase for the small group of transformative users or otherwise limit their ability to create. Indeed, it
seems likely that many producers would offer "no transformative use"
licenses (or at least "no parody" licenses) to the general public and
much more expensive "transformative use licenses" to potential transformative users.' It is unclear whether the increase in producer surplus
will compensate for this increase in the costs of creation." A complete
analysis of this complex problem is beyond the scope of this Article.

53 See, for example, Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L J 965, 1000-12 (1990)
(arguing that originality, as required by the Copyright Act, is actually a legal fiction).
54 This form of unbundling would reduce the volume of sales because some customers who
are interested in transformative use will not buy the product. Because of the small size of this
group, however, this decrease should not usually deter the producer from unbundling and separating transformative use.
55 For some users, especially those who do not create for profit, the increase in producer
surplus might be irrelevant. Thus, allowing the producer to attach a "no transformative work"
license to her work might extinguish some types of creation, such as YouTube parodies. See
Benkler, 74 NYU L Rev at 401-06 (cited in note 9).
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D. The Long-Term Efficiency of the ProCD Decision and the
ProCD Rule

The analysis in this Part suggests that because unbundling creates
an immediate substantial increase in the incentives for producing information goods while causing relatively little waste, if any, then when
society chooses the set of rules by which to incentivize creation, including the right to unbundle might be desirable. However, adding the
right to unbundle to an existing copyright system is desirable only if
the increase in producer surplus allows society to eliminate more
damaging elements that incentivize creation (for example, a long term
of protection). Therefore, although the analysis might support the
ProCD rule (allowing unbundling), it does not necessarily justify the
ProCD decision.

As Congress is in charge of putting together the package of incentives that authors receive, a court decision that allows unbundling may
not enhance efficiency. If Congress envisioned a world in which rights
would be partially bundled, then presumably the other elements of the
copyright system give authors proper incentives to create without unbundling.' If this is the case, then a court decision that allows unbundling without balancing the increase in the producer surplus by eliminating other legal tools that incentivize creation (for example, shortening the period of protection, which a court is institutionally incapable
of doing) distorts the "delicate balance" that Congress created. Because
unbundling increases producer surplus, doing so when the legal system
already properly incentivizes creation will create potentially distortionary incentives, which might lead to duplicative and socially wasteful
investment." Therefore, even if unbundling allows society to accord the
proper incentives for creation in a manner less harmful than other legal

56 Judge Easterbrook might disagree. See Easterbrook, 42 Houston L Rev at 961-63 (cited
in note 33) ("What is the right length of a copyright? No one knows."). But see generally Nimmer, Brown, and Frischling, 87 Cal L Rev 17 (cited in note 9) (discussing "copyright law's 'delicate balance' between the rights of copyright owners and copyright users" and the ways in which
the ProCD decision disturbed it). It seems that Easterbrook does not just argue that Congress
might "get it wrong" but also implicitly claims that because we cannot assume that Congress
made an optimal choice, its choice does not deserve special protection from alteration. See
Easterbrook, 42 Houston L Rev at 962-63 (cited in note 33). While a full analysis of the separation of powers in this context is beyond the scope of this Article, it seems that, as David Nimmer,
Elliot Brown, and Gary Frischling, pointed out, Easterbrook is questioning Congress's
longstanding role in finding this "delicate balance" and courts' role in preserving it. See, for
example, Stewart v Abend, 495 US 207, 230 (1990) ("[I1t is not our role to alter the delicate
balance Congress has labored to achieve."); Sony, 464 US at 429 ("[I]t is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.").
57 See note 45.
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rules, it seems that this benefit is obtainable only when such a change is
initiated by Congress as part of a larger reform.'
CONCLUSION

Copyright law bundles certain rights in information goods. Authors of information goods sometimes try to unbundle these rights by
using licenses. The enforceability of such licenses is a highly debated
issue in the copyright literature.
This Article explores some of the advantages and disadvantages
of these contracts from an economic efficiency perspective. It concludes that unbundling of rights has an ambiguous effect on the
deadweight loss created by the author's monopoly. Nevertheless, unbundling of rights might be desirable as an ex ante tool to incentivize
creation if the increase in the incentive to create is balanced by the
elimination or reduction of the harm caused by other legal rules that
incentivize creation.
The reduction in separation costs, as well as the adoption of the
ProCD rule by other courts, might create a proliferation of contracts
that reallocate rights in creative goods. Consequently, creative work
might be distributed in ways that Congress did not envision when it
enacted the Copyright Act. As these contracts might disturb the balance that the Copyright Act tries to achieve between the interests of
different groups, and in a way that is not necessarily efficient, Congress may need to intervene in order to reestablish the balance in the
copyright incentive system.

58 One may claim that Congress's action in recent decades should make us doubt its willingness to limit the rights of publishers of copyrightable work, in particular by shortening the
length of protection. See Easterbrook, 42 Houston L Rev at 962 (cited in note 33) ("A copyright
lasts the life of the author plus an additional period that Congress keeps increasing in response
to producers' lobbying."); Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 337, 350-54
(2002) ("[O]ur copyright laws have been written not by Congress, not by Congressional staffers,
not by the copyright office or by any public servant in the executive branch, but by copyright
lobbyists."). See also note 49. While this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, the public
choice argument cannot, in itself, justify the ProCD decision. Assuming that Congress consistently favors the interests of publishers, giving this group a larger incentive, as the ProCD decision did, does not balance this bias. On the contrary.
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